An icon of the later Cold War, Ronald Reagan’s military buildup was an expression of his worldview and a key focus of his presidency. Irrefutably, Reagan’s defense investment was a fundamental plank of his national security policy.[1] Naturally, these budgets shaped appraisals of his administration and served as grist for the mill of praise and criticism alike. Central to these assessments was the military buildup. A champion of fiscal restraint and austerity in government, Reagan conversely pushed for ever greater defense spending. Contemporary pundits attempted to succinctly characterize the composition and intent of Reagan’s program and the common appellation was that it was the “largest peacetime buildup in U.S. history.” That label has endured to the present. If this description is meant as a political slur, then it may be treated as hyperbole and should be dismissed as mere partisanship. However, if such a label is intended to be accurate which seems to be the case, then the assertion should be evaluated for accuracy. A brief comparison to other pre-war buildups is thus useful in making that determination. To Reagan, the pressing national security situation required an urgent and persistent investment in defense much like his predecessors’ and their buildups. To this point, Reagan’s buildup was certainly historically significant, but it was neither unique nor unprecedented in American history.
The portrayal of the Reagan military buildup as the “largest in U.S. peacetime history” seems to have originated early in 1981, shortly after the fortieth president took office. The editors of the New York Times in an article titled, “What Kind of Defense,” challenged the new administration’s vision on national defense by highlighting the increase in defense spending.[2] Noteworthy, the authors praised CBS for a “commendable dedication of five prime hours” to questioning the aims and extent of Reagan’s national security investment. The portrayal of unprecedented peacetime spending was echoed such as the following February by Leslie H. Gelb.[3] The appellation persisted throughout the ensuing decades and was repeated in numerous published works, articles, videos, and even textbooks. Many applications of the label were pejorative such as in works by Dana H. Allin, Sean Wilentz and Doug Rossinow.[4] In contrast, other authors and historians viewed the expenditures more favorable such as William Inboden in his recent work, The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink.[5] Following Caspar Weinberger’s funeral, journalist James K. Pinkerton wrote,
“Weinberger wanted peace, but he also wanted victory. And through preparation, he got it: a peaceful victory for America in the Cold War. . . As secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1987, he presided over the biggest peacetime buildup in U.S. history. A lot of money? You bet. That’s the American way: We prefer to invest in costly machines . . . as opposed to manpower. Weinberger’s way was a bargain: Money is cheaper than blood.[6]
Whatever the author’s inclination, the characterization has stuck and thus deserves historical scrutiny.
A clarification of terms is useful at this point, particularly defining a buildup as well as how to measure its scope relative to others in U.S. history. A military buildup is a generic characterization, not a technical description. Meaning, a buildup is not determined by certain numerical metrics in the same way an economy can be labeled expansive or contracting. Rather, a military buildup is best understood as an expansion of the armed forces for the purpose of improving its operational capabilities. When a nation’s military adds more combat units, a buildup is most likely in progress. These additions make new operations possible by enhancing the armed forces’ potential. In this way, a buildup is results oriented more than simply cosmetic.
Procurement alone does not necessarily constitute a buildup. For example, stockpiling bedding, stationary, or even ammunition does not qualify as a buildup in isolation. Filling out existing units to their pre-existing authorized strength levels is not in itself determinative. Likewise, the replacement of obsolete or worn-out technology on a one-to-one basis may not constitute a buildup. Such actions would need to be taken in concert with the forementioned improvement of operational potential. Beyond simply enhancing existing models, new technology often adds new capabilities which require revised training to exploit. In conjunction with other actions, these activities likely indicate a buildup is in progress. As such a buildup is a recognizable activity even though the particular benchmarks may vary.
Terms like “largest” are relative and need a basis of comparison as well as a metric. Several methods are employable to assess the scale of a buildup for comparative purposes, and all have virtues and vices. The least meaningful method, although common, is simple comparisons of dollars spent on defense. The most meaningful approach is to compare defense investments as a portion of a nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP.)
Simple contrasts of dollars expended can highlight differences in spectacular fashion, but ultimately have little real comparative value. For example, the U.S. spent $1.95 billion in total budget outlays in 1917 compared to 1980 when it spent $590.94 billion.[7] As impressive as these numerical differences are, they are meaningless due to differences in what was purchased, changes in accounting methods and, of course, inflation. Inflation is by far the major hurdle in making dollar for dollar comparisons.
As the value of a currency changes over time, the purchasing power of money fluctuates, which has dramatic effects on costs. Although shifts can be computed to reflect the change over time, such calculations alone do not generate wholly accurate comparisons. For example, in 1944, a Medium Tank, M4 (the primary American type,) cost between $42,400 and $67,173 depending on the model and the production facility.[8] At an average price of $54,786.50, the same tank would cost $324,049.70 in 1984.[9] However, this amount does not reflect changes in production costs such as labor and materials, but only the inflation of the value of the dollar. Moreover, an M1 Abrams tank (the standard Reagan era model) was significantly more expensive at $2.2 million in FY82.[10] Much of these costs reflect the tank’s greater manufacturing challenges and technical complexity, but do not reveal anything necessary to compare both vehicles as weapons.[11] By any measure, an M4 tank is not the equivalent of an M1 which is vastly superior in armor, mobility, and firepower. As such, comparisons of weapon systems based solely on cost are misleading and should be applied circumspectly. Other metrics are therefore necessary if comparisons of military buildups are to be meaningful.
Manpower and equipment strengths can be a useful comparison if one applies the results judiciously as well. Rates of growth or decline can be contrasted as manpower seemingly provides a comparison between like kinds (apples to apples.) However, misperceptions are still possible. For example, the Army had 776,937 active-duty soldiers (excluding cadets) as of September 30, 1981.[12] Seven years later, the Army decreased by 1.2% to 767,408. Taken in isolation, such data implies the absence of a buildup during the Reagan presidency. Moreover, President Jimmy Carter might even be interpreted as more hawkish than Reagan because he only permitted a 0.1% decline in Army manpower during his presidency.[13]
The fault in this formulation lies not in the arithmetic but in the inadequacy of the data points. Force multipliers such as procuring new technology and enhanced training (Operations) are not accounted for in the above computations. Like dollars expended, comparisons must include other crucial factors to be useful. For example, the real issue in contrasting manpower is one of proportionality. Manpower levels, particularly increases, are best understood in relation to existing strength and the overall population. Doubling manpower (100,00 to 200,000) from a population of 5 million signifies a much greater investment than the same doubling within a population of 100 million. Comparing aggregate personnel numbers can be useful within the right context and in conjunction with other measurements. Even so, a more useful means for comparisons is contrasting the cost of defense as a portion of the overall budget or, better still, a national metric such as GDP.
GDP may be defined as the sum of all goods and services produced in a nation in a given period, usually annually. An imperfect measurement, GDP is an amalgamation of a variety of statistical data points. These data points cover everything from individual enterprises to industrial output and all fiscal activity in-between. A complex formulation, GDP offers a composite picture of a nation’s productive activity which can then be used for comparisons. Accordingly, defense spending may be understood as the percentage of the nation’s productivity that was consumed for military purposes. Of course, challenges exist with this approach too. Comparisons of defense’s share of GDP from different eras is a matter of relativity to the overall whole economic activity from the periods. As a percentage of GDP, defense spending may be high in one era but will appear to shrink if overall GDP grows even though no real cuts occurred. Accordingly, it is best to see the military investment in conjunction with other government spending as a portion of GDP. In this way, the total spending is understood both as portion of the national budget and as an investment from the nation’s economic output.
Before comparing defense budgets, it is useful to highlight certain key features of the federal fiscal process in order to better understand what actually emerges as legal spending. Many budget observers such as journalists and historians often focus on budget proposals and debates rather than the actual expenditures. Such practice is mostly likely due to the more interesting analysis of politics rather than deciphering federal accounting. However, the result can be a distorted picture that reflects intentions rather than outcomes. Moreover, the U.S. budget seems to reflect a byzantine government bureaucracy designed to confound efficiency and fiscal accountability. A cursory reading of the Constitution implies a clear-cut procedure of legislative proposal, debate, passage, and then either acquisition or expenditure of funds by the executive. However, the process is not that straightforward, and the complexity multiplies with the political sensitivity of the issue. Every defense spending proposal must pass multiple benchmarks in a process designed to impede rapid action by a minority. Although procedures may seem convoluted and redundant externally, they are essential for maintaining limits on political power. Consequently, every annual budget undergoes numerous modifications before it becomes public law (PL) and is truly a collaborative effort across branches and parties. Unfortunately, this complexity muddles analysis and review by future researchers.[14]
At a macro level, the federal budget consists of Congressional authorizations and appropriations to executive agencies who spend federal money. This legislative power is grounded in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. In short, an authorization bill, if passed into law, establishes a federal entity or program with the authority to accrue obligations (debt.) However, no funds are available until Congress specifies the limits which agencies are authorized to pay for obligations via an appropriations bill. Appropriations are not fiscal disbursements; they are just the legal limit for spending. Actual disbursements known as outlays are executed by the designated agencies as they carry out their functions. Appropriations often contain specific parameters on the use of funds particularly in defense. In this way, Congress maintains a degree of control over any fiscal activity that may occur.[15]
A new fiscal year’s budget originates in the executive branch and are submitted by the President to Congress. A detailed description of defense budget formulation is far too lengthy for review here, but it is essential to recognize that the president’s proposed budget is a compromise of competing interests. Each department and agency submit proposals to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which collates them into a functional budget. The President and his staff then approve or refine it according to policy goals and priorities. Under Reagan, the departments, agencies, and OMB coordinated early in the process (often heatedly) so that the President received a largely finalized product.[16] Before the federal fiscal year begins (July 1 before 1976, then October 1,) the budget proposal is sent to Congress by February. Noteworthy, when a new president takes office, both the existing budget and the proposal for the upcoming fiscal year are products of the previous administration.
The President’s budget serves as the starting framework for Congress who is not legally obligated to adhere to it. In the House and Senate, Congressional procedure requires separate yet similar steps, culminating in a joint bill for the President to sign into law. Congressional committees and sub-committees dissect budget proposals, exploring issues such as military pay, procurement or housing. For defense, the Armed Services Committee handles authorizations while the Committee on Appropriations deals with appropriations. Committees hold hearings to question officials and experts and hear testimony from interested parties. Members often seek research and analysis from the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Budget Office on key items. For a bill to advance, it must pass through the committees, each house, and then differences reconciled before a joint bill is sent to the White House for the President’s approval. Interestingly, the authorizations bill may contain spending limits which are not binding on any appropriations. The different committees frequently disagree but do attempt to harmonize both bills. Although simplified here, this method is a hallmark of American deliberative process and illustrates how many “yea” votes are required before any expenditure takes place.[17]
A key observation is that an analysis of a federal budget must recognize the hybrid nature of the final product. Labels such as Carter’s budget or Reagan’s budget are referential conveniences that obscure the totality of the fiscal process. Final budgets contain numerous Congressional edits, sometimes very specific, reflecting legislators’ own priorities. In 1983, Reagan noted in his diary, “When we got our 1981 – 3yr. tax cut [,] we had to take a lot of ornaments [extra spending] demanded by Congress.”[18] During the 1980s, federal spending consistently exceeded revenues creating deficits and necessitating borrowing. Reagan faced criticism for this excess, yet every fiscal bill passed through Congress who routinely modified spending to reach political consensus. As such, the final public law is a blend of legislative and executive initiatives heavily influenced by party, regional, and special interest politics. The financing of Reagan’s buildup was no different in that it was very much a product of this federal budget process.[19]
Adding to the complexity, the administration and Congress have several mechanisms to modify spending after the bills become law. These mechanisms include supplementals, reprogramming, transfers, and rescission of prior funding. Supplementals increase limits on existing authorizations and appropriations and may impose new restrictions. Reprogramming shifts funds in a department from one program to another, while transfers move funds from one budget category to another. A rescission takes back funds from a prior appropriation if a program is terminated, or priorities change before the law expires.[20] Each authorization and appropriation act have a defined period which is usually one year. However, defense spending has varying time frames: one year for Research and Development, Personnel, and Operations. Procurement is three years except shipbuilding which is five. Once the period ends, the appropriation is pronounced expired, and agencies may not take on new obligations. However, they may use the remaining funds to service outstanding obligations for the next five years. [21]
These financial gyrations create additional challenges for researchers. For example, in FY84, the administration requested $57.7 million for the reactivation of the battleship Missouri, which Congress granted in the defense authorization.[22] However, the subsequent naval appropriation restricted funding pending congressional review of the Navy’s plans. The FY84 supplemental (PL98-396) then appropriated $336 million (a 482% increase) for the project. [23] Likewise, in FY86, Congress transferred $6.6 billion from prior years’ appropriations to the current, which did not constitute an increase in defense spending since the funds were previously alloted. Such actions complicate efforts to discern actual spending in a given year, particularly when tracing how funding impacts specific programs. For historians, the key to analysis is cross-referencing the appropriations, obligations, and final outlays across multiple fiscal years. The president’s budgets and Congressional action reveal fiscal intent by the relationship between proposal, authorization, and appropriation. However, the outlays constitute the actual expenditure of funds and thus are the most useful for making comparisons between administrations.
Figure 1. The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 – 2028,” Historical Tables. Accessed August 24, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/.
Like his predecessors, Reagan’s defense budgets were influenced by the national security challenges and perceptions of his era. A detailed examination of the rationale in each case is beyond the scope of this work, although some basic context is needed in order to contrast defense spending between different administrations. The origins of Reagan’s military buildup can be traced back to Richard Nixon and the post-Vietnam War climate in Congress, where both parties viewed the end of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia as an opportunity to reshape federal spending. In the decade leading up to this shift, military expenditures had reached 8.6% of GDP.[24] Advocating for a balanced budget, President Nixon agreed with Congress that a “peace dividend” was appropriate post-Vietnam and supported cuts in defense spending as long as they did not jeopardize the strategic balance of the Cold War. [25]
This balance was largely defined by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), reinforced by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the policy of détente. Despite the terrifying nature of MAD, it created a certain stability in the nuclear arms race. Current strategic (nuclear) arsenals were deemed relatively sufficient to maintain the balance power, so the fiscal axe largely fell on conventional (non-nuclear) forces which accounted for the bulk of defense costs anyway. Strategic assets were viewed as too vital for reductions, and SALT had already set limits on nuclear forces. The policy of détente had partly been formulated with the idea of reduced defense budgets in mind as a means to wage the Cold War without the large conventional forces of prior years. Moreover, other factors made conditions in the early 1970s ripe for a broad reduction in America’s standing army, naval, and air forces.[26]
The transition to an all-volunteer force marked a major transformation of the American armed forces during the Cold War. The draft, established under the Selective Service Act of 1948 and expanded in 1951, enlisted millions who otherwise most likely would not have volunteered. Nixon campaigned on the promise to end the draft, and after extending it for two years in 1971, allowed it to expire in 1973 with widespread Congressional backing. This led to a dramatic reduction in armed forces. The Army’s strength fell from 1.57 million in 1968 to around 767,000 in 1973 which was below its authorized level. The Air Force was also downsized, but the Navy’s manpower problems were compounded by the retirement of an aging fleet. As older vessels reached the end of their service lives, maintenance issues and costs rose which curtailed deployments. Although some capital ships were scrapped, the acute loss of the escort vessels needed to counter Soviet submarines was particularly dangerous. The vaunted carrier fleet also suffered cuts, losing twelve vessels between 1970 and 1980, with only replacement completed in that timeframe. The nuclear submarine program remained relatively intact, largely due to the political influence of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, although construction slowed. [27] Concurrently, Soviet armed forces continued an expansion (the Brezhnev buildup) begun in the mid-1960s. Troop strength in eastern Europe increased by over a quarter of its 1968 total and the Soviet navy evolved into a global operating force that seriously threatened Western security.[28]
Gerald Ford’s presidency began amidst the turmoil of the Watergate scandal which deprived him of any strong political mandate to implement his policies. In this climate, Republican support was weak, and Democratic opposition was fierce. Ford recognized that the post-Vietnam cuts to defense spending were excessive but reversing them proved difficult. Rising inflation compounded the challenge, limiting prospects for increased military funding. Despite efforts to secure a 4% annual increase to counter inflation in FY75, defense budgets failed to keep pace with rising inflation. By 1977, the defense spending fell significantly to 4.8% of GDP in contrast to pre-Vietnam level of 8.3% in 1964. Simultaneously, inflation steadily eroded the purchasing power of the dollar amidst rising overall costs. [29]
Jimmy Carter entered office determined to stabilize the economy, balance the budget and redefine the Cold War.[30] Initially, he rejected Ford’s defense initiatives, prioritizing other federal expenditures and opposing significant increases, which led to a net decline in defense finances during his first two years. However, Congress took bipartisan action in 1979 to address defense funding inadequacies, leading to unusual circumstances such as when Carter vetoed his own defense budget. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, Carter reversed his earlier positions, advocating for a modest military buildup. These shifts laid the groundwork for the defense investments that Reagan would implement when he took office in 1981.
Figure 2. “Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 – 2028.”
Reagan’s 1980 campaign highlighted the inadequacies of his predecessor’s defense budgets which Carter tacitly acknowledged by his late-term increases. Reagan made it clear that he intended to sustain Carter’s boost to defense spending and to surpass it. Both privately and publicly, Reagan maintained that Carter’s policies had damaged American standing in the world in real terms. Among his supporters, the feeling was strong that the dramatic failure to rescue the Iranian hostages was emblematic of Carter’s poor stewardship of defense. Likewise, other events demonstrated the ongoing Cold War danger such as the Soviet intervention in Africa and communist revolutionary activity in Central America, highlighted by the loss of Nicaragua. National defense needed fresh and sustained investment to meet the Cold War challenges. In contrast to his commitment to cut expenditures and shrink the size of federal bureaucracy, Reagan took the opposite approach regarding the Department of Defense.[31]
Historian Jonathan Reed Winkler summarized Reagan’s military budget in a succinct but useful perspective. He noted that in actual defense outlays, the nation spent $157.5 billion in 1981 which grew to $303.6 billion by 1989, an increase of 93%. In 1981, defense spending accounted for 23.2% of Federal outlays and 5.2% of GDP. Winkler sets 1987 as the peak year when defense was 28.1% of the budget and 6.1% of GDP before gradually declining.[32] Reagan’s first Treasury Secretary, Donald Regan, later characterized the defense spending as “staggering” but “absolutely necessary” due to the negligence of both parties in the 1970s.[33] Even so, Winkler noted that the Pentagon’s budget was not the largest piece of the fiscal pie nor did it account for the largest area of growth. The total Federal budget grew by 69% between 1981 and 1989 of which the Pentagon accounted for only 32% of the expansion. [34] Despite Reagan’s efforts, federal spending grew consistently during his presidency and any savings from cutting non-defense agencies largely never materialized.
In the first two years, defense expenditures grew rapidly with broad bi-partisan support that would gradually diminish. Total annual growth averaged 8.94% between FY82 to FY88, but this number can be misleading as the increases were not applied evenly. FY84 saw a 29.57% boost, but the following years were substantially less.[35] The net result was a greater investment than anything supported by the Nixon, Ford or Carter administrations. Ideological differences aside, a common factor among the previous decade’s presidents was an unwillingness to accept a deficit to finance defense. Conversely, Reagan argued that the urgency of the Cold War mandated a temporary assumption of debt. His administration believed that any accrued burden could be eliminated within a decade by cutting other spending and a robust economy, empowered by less taxation and regulatory restraint.[36]
Figure 3. “Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 – 2028.”
Although Congress broadly approved Reagan’s buildup, the legislature did not just mildly acquiesce to each budget request. Unlike the later Carter years, Congress usually provided less funds than requested in each proposed budget. For example, FY84 appropriations for Procurement totaled $85.36 billion against a request of $92.59 billion.[37] Likewise, Congress granted $26.69 billion for Research and Development instead of $28.5 billion and $72.82 billion for Operations rather than $74.97 billion. Nevertheless, Congress approved 95.74% of the president’s proposed defense budget.[38] Final votes on the acts on passage were rarely close: for FY84, the House voted 311-99 and the Senate was 75-6 in favor. Such actions reveal clear support for the military buildup but not a legislative blank check. A noteworthy trend was the regular occurrence of appropriations exceeding authorizations in individual categories or in the total FY act. Evidently, Congress clearly supported the principle of a buildup but was as disunited over how to allocate funds as it was at odds with the administratio
In spite of overall support, Congress early on expressed concern over the growing deficit which the buildup was a contributing factor. Congressman Joseph P. Addabbo (Democrat – New York) served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, in 1981. After submitting the committee report for FY82, he opened debate on the House floor with some illustrative remarks. Addabbo proclaimed,
Mr. Chairman, it is with a deep sense of mixed emotions that I bring to the committee today the largest defense appropriations bill ever presented to any legislative body. Though the bill has my name on it, it is not actually my bill. It is the Defense Subcommittee’s bill . . . What we have before us is a total increase of almost $50 billion over 1981 . . . which is more than almost every other appropriation for every other agency.[39]
After invoking Eisenhower’s famous warning about the military-industrial complex, Addabbo went on to stress his love for the country and appreciation for a strong defense. Critical of certain Reagan initiatives (the B-1, the MX, the Pershing II IRBM, etc.), Addabbo evidently supported increases as long as the money was utilized in ways he deemed fiscally responsible. He stressed that any cuts to administration requests had to be considered relative to the overall increases.
Addabbo’s comments at the onset of Reagan’s defense program may be seen as sincere call for fiscal discipline but are nevertheless ironic. Reagan’s efforts to reduce non-defense spending were largely stymied by Congressional opposition. Moreover, defense was not the sole reason for the expanding debt as reflected by its portion of the annual budget. Expanding non-discretionary entitlement programs, largely championed by Addabbo’s own party, were the primary cause. Mandatory spending (non-discretionary, excluding debt) averaged 10.2% GDP or 9.3% with the benefit of offsetting receipts (direct taxes). Including debt payments, mandatory spending never fell below 11.7% of GDP for the entire period. Rising from 5% (FY81) to 6% (FY86), defense spending initially increased at a faster rate than mandatory, but it plateaued and then steadily declined to 5.5% of GDP by FY89 when Reagan left office.[40]
The question remains as to how Reagan’s buildup compared to other 20th century American military buildups and whether it was unprecedented in scale. The first peacetime buildup occurred in 1916 as the nation contemplated entering World War I. Since 1914, President Woodrow Wilson gradually accepted the need to increase the Army and Navy before war was finally declared April 6, 1917. This buildup was minute compared to future peacetime defense investments but was nevertheless an unprecedented military expansion outside of war. Even so, the U.S. was grossly unprepared to enter the war in almost every meaningful way. For example, the U.S. Army numbered a mere 133,111 which could be reinforced by 185,000 National Guardsmen if the requisite legal action permitted overseas deployment. By 1917, casualty rates among the Great Powers suggested that an American army of that size would last less than one month in combat. [41] Few things illustrate the sheer unpreparedness more than the fact that American forces required over a year’s preparation before significant combat operations could even begin. This delay had little to do with transportation across the Atlantic and everything to do with organizing, training, and equipping the expanding armed forces. This unsettling experience would influence American ideas about military preparedness for the rest of the century especially when confronted by dangerous rivals like Japan, Germany, and the USSR. Comparatively, Wilson’s buildup was miniscule, but it’s failure to adequately prepare the armed forces provided a stark contrast with the goals of Reagan.
The shortcomings of Wilson’s defense policies were not lost on the Roosevelt administration who boldly took steps to avoid repeating the unpreparedness of World War I. From September 1939 to December 1941, these rearmament efforts surpassed anything before or since and thus constitute the largest peacetime buildup in American history. Historians tend to fold this preparedness program into the overall history of World War II which obscures the fact that nation implemented a massive military buildup while it was still at peace. Even after it was implemented, Roosevelt’s intention to keep the nation out of war only ended after the Axis powers declared war. In those 28 months, the experience and conditioning gained by the armed forces proved as valuable as the material acquisitions. His foresight on preparedness was certainly the correct policy. Although not wholly successful, one shudders at the repercussions had the U.S. entered the war in 1942 with its 1939 army of 188,565 poorly trained and sparsely equipped soldiers. Noteworthy, Reagan’s aims echoed Roosevelt’s in that the defense buildup was anticipatory and while hopeful for peace, he prepared for war.[42]
Between the attack on Poland (September 1, 1939) and Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941,) the U.S Army expanded to 1,303,231 soldiers, an increase of 591%.[43] Such expansion was only possible because of an unprecedented peacetime draft that registered over 17.38 million eligible males by 1942. In comparison, Reagan rejected calls for a return to the draft in 1981-82 and firmly espoused the all-volunteer force. On August 27, 1940, the National Guard was inducted into Federal Service, fifteen months before war was declared. Concurrently, the Army Air Corps planned to add almost 8,000 combat planes along with the necessary personnel. In total, more than $8 billion dollars were appropriated to the Army alone which surpassed the combined budgets of the previous twenty years.[44] Inflation was almost flat in the period, so such fiscal comparisons are possible. Equally impressive, the Navy ordered eleven Essex class carriers (the best design of the war), seven South Dakota and Iowa class battleships, eight Baltimore class heavy cruisers, and over one hundred light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. All of this new naval construction was in preparation, not a response, to fight a global war.[45]
Military outlays as percentage of the total budget were 13.1% (FY39), 17.56% (FY40), and 49.57% (FY41). By the end of FY41 (June 30, 1941), the federal government spent $6.3 billion on defense reflecting an increase of 558% over FY38’s $957 million. The FY42 budget adopted six months before Pearl Harbor continued this growth albeit at a reduced rate of increase but without any spending cuts either. In this budget, defense spending accounted for 73% of total outlays and amounted to 17.4% of GDP. Noteworthy, the first wartime budget (FY43) rose to 84.9% of expenditures and 36.1% of GDP. Such increases were necessary even after three years of prewar investment. Although Roosevelt’s program was subsumed by the war, it remains unsurpassed as the largest peacetime buildup in US history. Reagan’s buildup may have lasted longer in years but never even closely matched the defense investments of the early 1940s.[46]
Figure 4. “Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 – 2028.”
The first decade of the Cold War was reminiscent of both the unpreparedness of World War I and the rush to rearm prior to World War II. After victory in 1945, the United States instituted a massive demobilization of armed forces with an eye on earning a peace dividend. Atomic weapons were to be the bulwark of American defense as a more cost effective, but potent deterrent against any aggressors. However, the Greek Civil War, the Berlin Blockade, the communist seizure of China, and the onset of the Korean War demonstrated the inadequacy of atomic weapons for maintaining peace and security. The Truman administration, after much resistance, reversed course and wholeheartedly initiated a buildup to contain the Soviets and combat communist aggression. These steps included the reimplementation of the peacetime draft (1948) as well as a significant boost in defense spending.[47]
In FY46, the administration spent $42.6 billion on defense which was 77.3% of total outlays and 18.7% GDP. In FY47, defense investments fell to $12.8 billion and accounted for 37.1% of all Federal spending, but only 5.4% of GDP. Outlays fell again in FY48 to equal 3.5% GDP. After the onset of the Korean War, the defense budget doubled in dollars spent and leapt from 7.2% of GDP to 12.9% (68.1% of total outlays) by FY52. Appropriations for FY53 increased further to 13.9% of GDP which amounted to an 8.9% increase since FY50. The “police action” in Korea accounted for a portion of these expenses but not as much as might be assumed. Instead of the 4.9% of 1950, defense spending after the 1953 armistice gradually declined to 9.1% by 1961. These numbers reflect the Eisenhower administration attempts to reduce overall military spending by a return to relying on nuclear weapons. The “New Look,” as it was termed, proved inadequate to national security needs. The draft was not repealed, and the requirements of Cold War global leadership pushed the United States into record levels of defense spending that did not abate until the early 1970s.[48]
Figure 5. “Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 – 2028.”
During the Kennedy administration, national defense outlays grew steadily in dollars even as it declined proportionally relative to the total budget and GDP. Such numbers indicate a growth in the economy, but also an expansion of non-defense spending. Even so, annual defense spending averaged 50.6% of budget and 8.7% of GDP between FY 61 and FY64. During this period, Army active-duty strength increased by 13.7%. The other services grew less, but still significantly: Air Force, 5.88%; Navy, 5.99%; and the Marine Corps, 7.22%. Reagan’s numbers seem almost anemic by comparison and yet, few, if any, scholars heap derision on the Kennedy buildup. The Johnson administration had no desire to appear soft on communism by cutting defense and defense budgets grew from $54.7 billion in FY64 to $82.5 billion in FY69. Of course, a significant portion of this increase was due to the war in Vietnam. Johnson’s last budget (FY69) had defense at 8.4% of GDP and 44.9% of the budget. However, these expenditures continued to decline proportionally relative to other federal spending. Entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare as well as the Great Society began to supplant defense as the largest outlay and finally did so in 1972. Defense spending would eventually fall to 4.5% of GDP in 1979 under Carter, the lowest in thirty plus years of Cold War.[49]
Figure 7. “Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 – 2028.”
Following Carter’s late term fiscal reversal, Reagan’s buildup took 24.8% of the federal budget in 1982 which was up from the Cold War low point of 22.8% (1980.) As a percentage of GDP, Reagan used 5.6% for defense in 1982 and peaked at 6% in 1987 when it consumed 28.1% of the Federal budget. Assuredly, Reagan’s program was a substantially greater investment than during the Ford or Carter years. However, in retrospect, defense in the 1970s appears underfunded in contrast to the rest of the Cold War. In terms of the fiscal commitments, Reagan’s buildup was not extraordinary when compared to the record of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Although the speed at which it was implemented was impressive, Reagan’s buildup never challenged the pace of Roosevelt’s program in 1940 – 41.
Roosevelt faced incredible danger in a deteriorating international scene. However, the mortal threat of the Axis powers was potential, not actual in 1941. Neither Italy, Japan nor Germany had the means to invade and devastate the United States. By comparison, Reagan faced an advisory with more destructive power than the Axis combined who overtly threatened American security and stability. Furthermore, Reagan unlike his immediate predecessor, realized that the unpredictability and rapidity which a military crisis might develop required the United States to be ready to fight now. Both world wars and the early Cold War had demonstrated the folly in postponing military preparedness when an international adversary was active. The armed forces required time to develop and mature if catastrophe was to be averted on the first day of a conflict. The time to invest was therefore before a crisis and only the allocation of sufficient funds to that purpose would pay dividends.
When Jimmy Carter entered the White Office, he came with a determination to disrupt what he perceived as the normal operating mode in the beltway. Carter liked to think of himself as an outsider and in many ways, the characterization was appropriate. For instance, he noted in his memoir, “education was still sometimes treated in Washington as an afterthought or nuisance . . . I considered the creation of jobs and the education of young people a sound investment for the future rather than a simple one-time budget expenditure.”[50] Moreover, Carter made balancing the budget and reducing deficits commensurate with his progressive agenda.
The continual growth in inflation was a primary concern. Due to the tremendous increase in Federal entitlement programs, the only way to accomplish fiscal solvency was by curbing discretionary spending such as defense. Carter made his views clear at the time and sustained them later, writing, “The lobbies [weapons manufacturers] are a growing menace to our democratic system of government . . . The resulting purchase of unnecessary military equipment is undoubtedly the most wasteful element in American government.”[51] This perception fit neatly within his belief about the Cold War and the role détente would play in changing the global stage. Carter was neither ignorant nor ambivalent to the issues of the Cold War. However, he believed that dialogue and détente (as he understood it) had a greater capacity to transform international relations than military investments and posturing. Moreover, he argued that the balance of power via MAD had largely negated the utility of extensive conventional forces.[52]
Carter intended to find the savings he desired by curbing Ford’s fiscal initiatives for defense. Frank L. Jones, a former Defense Department official and historian, argued in a 2012 paper for the US Army War College that Carter sought to restructure the military along lines that reflected the financial realities of the day. The “hollow army” that General Edward Myer (USA) famously testified about in 1980 was the result of unbalanced funding polices from the former president and Congress.[53] Jones wrote, “the Ford administration increased the Army’s force structure without a commensurate increase in personnel or funding, a situation that Congress abetted.”[54] Military deficiencies were caused by a failure to match ends to means. By his own admission, Jones’ goal was to defend President Barrack Obama’s defense budget by offering the analogy that Carter’s policies were not as detrimental as claimed by political critics and pundits. Jones noted that Carter in his Presidential Directive/National Security Council-18 (August 24, 1977) affirmed the commitment to NATO and stated the goal of maintaining the balance of power with the Soviets “as it now exists.”[55]
Carter’s policy for defense spending can be summarized as one of maintenance in contrast to expansion or reduction. To that end, Carter cancelled several programs such as the Navy’s new nuclear aircraft carrier and the Air Force’s B-1 bomber while scaling back a host of Army modernization efforts such as adopting the M-1 tank. The core of this outlook was that Carter believed the US military in 1977 was adequate for the challenges it faced even if it needed some refinements. He did not reject enhancements to the force but argued that fiscal discipline took priority and thus expenses had to be cut. Citing lack of time for revisions, he accepted the proposed Ford budget for FY77 while simultaneously condemning it. Carter’s first real budget was FY78, and it contained increases of $605 million to some areas of the military, but $3.357 billion in cuts for net $2.752 billion reduction. Eighty percent of these cuts were to the conventional forces.[56]
In a series of Gallup polls in 1979, Americans indicated a growing dissatisfaction with the state of national defense. Only 25% of respondents claimed they had “a great deal” of confidence in the American military and 58% stated that the Soviets were either equal or stronger than the U.S.[57] In western Europe, the findings were worse:
Survey results concerning American power vis-a-vis Russia and China indicate that citizens of these five nations [Great Britain, France, Canada, Netherlands, and West Germany] take a generally pessimistic view of the developing balance of world power. . . It is US power that is most likely to be seen as on the wane.[58]
However, they inexplicably added the caveat that such results should not be interpreted to indicate a loss of confidence in the U.S. In his 2020 military history of the Cold War, Jonathan M. House observed, “Critics of the Carter budgets were perhaps unreasonable in their expectations, but the combination of recruiting and funding issues left the American forces undermanned and underfunded in the 1970s.”[59] In his last years in office, Carter reluctantly came to a similar conclusion. Global crises such as the overthrow of the pro-American shah in Iran, the subsequent hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clinched the issue that more defense funding was needed. The Carter administration never made it clear how such funds would alter these developments. Nonetheless, these measures do constitute a tacit acknowledgement that American military forces as deterrents were not what they should be.
Even if he had been inclined to act, Carter was honest enough to admit that the US military was ill-prepared to respond to crisis at its current funding. However, his FY79 defense budget increased spending by only 1.8% and included several bruising fights with Congress and DoD who wanted more. In FY81, his budget jumped by 7.8% with a proposed 5.3% increase in FY82 for total authority of $171.2 billion and $196.4 billion respectively. Even so, Carter sought to limit any increase in procurement to only 1.2%. This investment was still beneficial to many defense programs that later proved foundational in Reagan’s buildup. For Carter, the political damage was already done. In January 1980, Gallup reported that 49% of Americans felt too little was spent on defense. Despite the budget increases for FY80 and FY81, Americans and allies saw Carter’s reversal as symptomatic of his flawed outlook on the Cold War.[60]
Figure 8. “Table 3.1 – Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940 – 2028.”
From the standpoint of GDP, Reagan’s buildup was a shift to the more normal defense budgets required by the Cold War whereas the 1970s represented a period of deficit. Questions and debate are certainly appropriate regarding how the funds were spent and which defense programs deserved priority. Even so, Reagan’s defense buildup was not untimely, irresponsible nor unprecedented. The military certainly benefited as demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War and continued to reap dividends well into the new millennium. With such a large infusion of funds, these results are perhaps to expected. In the shadow of former administration particular Wilson and Roosevelt, Reagan’s buildup was a reasonable and prudent step considering the national security threats of the later Cold War.
Selected Bibliography
Primary Sources
Abel, Martin E., David W. Breneman, Anthony Downs, Robert W. Hartman, Herschel Kantor, Joseph J. Minarik, John L. Palmer, Joseph A. Pechman, and Charles A. Sorrels. Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978.
Aaron, Henry J., Barry P. Bosworth, Edward M. Gramlich, Robert W. Hartman, William W. Kaufmann, Deborah S. Laren and Charles L. Schultze. Setting National Priorities: The 1983 Budget. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982.
Aaron, Henry, Thomas A. Dine, Robert W. Hartman, Bruce K. MacLaury, Daniel J. B. Mitchell, and Joseph A. Pechman. Setting National Priorities: The 1980 Budget. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979.
Blechman, Barry M., Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman. Setting National Priorities: The 1976 Budget. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975.
Bosworth, Barry P., Robert W. Hartman, William W. Kaufmann, Joseph A. Pechman, and A. James Reichley. Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981.
Carter, Jimmy. A Government as Good as Its People. Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22h6q8j.1.
——. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1995. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/liberty/detail.action?docID=2007592.
CQ Press Library. CQ Almanac 1975, 31st ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1976. https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/toc.php?mode=cqalmanac-toc&level=2&values=1975+-+94th+Congress%2C+1st+Session.
——. CQ Almanac 1983, 39th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1984. https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/toc.php?mode=cqalmanac-toc&level=2&values=1983+-+98th+Congress%2C+1st+Session.
——. CQ Almanac 1984, 40th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1985. https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/toc.php?mode=cqalmanac-toc&level=2&values=1984+-+98th+Congress%2C+2nd+Session.
Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984 – 1988 Defense Programs. 98th Cong., 1st sess. February 1, 1983. Adobe PDF.
——. Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982 – 1986 Defense Programs. 97th Cong., 1st sess. January 19, 1981. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1982_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150904-113.
Department of the Navy. Justifications of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1984 (U) Procurement: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy. Washington, D.C: Office of the Comptroller, January 1983. Adobe PDF.
Department of the Treasury. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1939. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1938. Adobe PDF.
——. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1940. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1939. Adobe PDF.
——. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1941. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1940. Adobe PDF.
——. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1942. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1941. Adobe PDF.
——. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1943. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1942. Adobe PDF.
——. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1952. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1942. Adobe PDF.
Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978.
Reagan, Ronald. “Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety.” Speech delivered at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Chicago, IL, August 18, 1980. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/peace-restoring-margin-safety.
——. “Republican National Convention Acceptance Speech, 1980.” Speech, Republican National Convention, Detroit, MI, July 17, 1980. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/republican-national-convention-acceptance-speech-1980.
——. “Ronald Reagan’s Announcement for Presidential Candidacy.” Speech, National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 20, 1975. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/ronald-reagan-announcement-presidential-candidacy.
——. “Ronald Reagans announcement for Presidential Candidacy, 1979.” Speech, New York Hilton, New York, NY, November 13, 1979. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/ronald-reagans-announcement-presidential-candidacy-1979.
——. Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989.
——. “Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan ‘A Strategy for Peace in the 80s’,” Televised campaign address, October 19, 1980. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/televised-address-governor-ronald-reagan-strategy-peace-80s.
——. The Reagan Diaries. Vol. 1, January 1981 – October 1985. Edited by Douglas Brinkley. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010. Nook.
——. “To Restore America.” Televised campaign address, March 31, 1976. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/restore-america.
Reed, Thomas C. At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War. New York: Presidio Press, 2005. Nook.
Regan, Donald T. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1988.
Stockman, David A. The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed. 1986. Reprint, New York: Public Affairs, 2013. Nook.
Weinberger, Caspar. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. New York: Warner Books, 1990.
Secondary Sources
Allin, Dana H. Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969 – 1989. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998.
Friedman, Norman. The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. United States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces, Vol. 1. The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. 1947. Reprint, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987.
House, Jonathan M. A Military History of the Cold War, 1962 – 1991. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2020. Nook.
Inboden, William. The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink. New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2022. Nook.
Johns, Andrew L., ed. A Companion to Ronald Reagan. Oxford, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2015.
Jones, Frank L. A “Hollow Army” Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012. Adobe PDF. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/331/.
Keefer, Edward C. Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge 1977 – 1981. Secretaries of Defense Historical Series 9. Washington D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017. Adobe PDF.
Kengor, Paul. The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006. Nook.
Millett, Allan R. and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. 3rd. ed., New York: Free Press, 2012.
Polmar, Norman and Kenneth J. Moore. Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2004. Nook.
Rossinow, Doug. The Reagan Era: A History of the 1980s. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
Schick, Allen. The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2007. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/liberty/detail.action?docID=315013.
Taylor, William A. Military Service and American Democracy: From World War II to the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016. Nook.
Thomson, Harry C. and Lida Mayo. United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services: The Ordnance Department. Vol. 2, Procurement and Suppl. Edited by Stetson Conn. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991.
US Congress, Congressional Research Service. Authorizations and the Appropriations Process, by James V. Saturno. R46497, May 16, 2023. Adobe PDF.
——. Expiration and Cancellation of Unobligated Funds, by Taylor N. Riccard. IF12329, February 15, 2023. Adobe PDF.
US Congress, Government Accountability Office. A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process. GAO-05-734SP, September 2005. Adobe PDF.
Watson, Mark Skinner. United States Army in World War II, The War Department: Chief of Staff. Vol.1, Prewar Plans and Preparations. Edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield. 1950. Reprint, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991. Adobe PDF.
Weigley, Russel F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973.
Wilentz, Sean. The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974 – 2008. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008.
Wirls, Daniel. Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.
[1] Ronald Reagan, “Ronald Reagan’s Announcement for Presidential Candidacy” (speech, National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 20, 1975), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/ronald-reagan-announcement-presidential-candidacy; ——., “To Restore America” (televised campaign address, March 31, 1976). https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/restore-america; ——., “Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety” (speech delivered at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Chicago, IL, August 18, 1980). https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/peace-restoring-margin-safety. ——., “Message of the President on the Budget,” in Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions: Additional Details on Budget Savings, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., April 1981), M-3. Adobe PDF; —–., “Part 1: The Budget Message of the President,” in Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1986, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., February 1985), M7-M8. Adobe PDF.
[2] “What Kind of Defense?” New York Times, opinion, June 16, 1981.
[3] Leslie H. Gelb, “Reagan’s Military Budget puts Emphasis on a Buildup of U.S. Global power,” New York Times, February 7, 1982.
[4] Dana H. Allin, Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969 – 1989 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 76 – 77; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974 – 2008 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 138, 206, 280; Doug Rossinow, The Reagan Era: A History of the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 40.
[5] William Inboden, The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2022), 23.
[6] James P. Pinkerton, “Money is cheaper than blood,” Newsday, April 6, 2006.
[7] The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Table 1.1—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-): 1789–2028,” Historical Tables. Accessed August 24, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/.
[8] Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo, United States Army in World War II, The Technical Service: The Ordnance Department, vol. 2, Procurement and Supply, ed. Stetson Conn (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991), 256.
[9] U.S. Department of Labor, “Inflation Calculator,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, Accessed August 12, 2023. https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/statistics/inflation.
[10] Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984 – 1988 Defense Programs. 98th Cong., 1st sess. (February 1, 1983), 127. Adobe PDF.
[11] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, S. Rep. 97-58, 78.
[12] Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, “Military Personnel on Active Duty by Grade in which Serving a/ September 30, 1981,” DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports and Publications, Historical Reports – FY 1954 – 1993 (Not DMC Data), last accessed December 30, 2023. https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports; ——., “Military Personnel on Active Duty by Grade in which Serving a/ September 30, 1988,” DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports and Publications, Historical Reports – FY 1954 – 1993 (Not DMC Data), last accessed December 30, 2023. https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports.
[13] Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, “Military Personnel on Active Duty by Grade in which Serving a/ September 30, 1977,” DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports and Publications, Historical Reports – FY 1954 – 1993 (Not DMC Data), last accessed December 30, 2023. https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports. ——., “Military Personnel on Active Duty by Grade in which Serving a/ September 30, 1981,” DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports and Publications, Historical Reports – FY 1954 – 1993 (Not DMC Data), last accessed December 30, 2023. https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports.
[14] Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process. 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 2-3. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/liberty/detail.action?docID=315013.
[15] Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 45 – 47; Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, Setting National Priorities: The 1976 Budget (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), 17; US Congress, Government Accountability Office, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP (September 2005), 13-14, 20-21, Adobe PDF; Schick, The Federal Budget, 191, 194.
[16] David A. Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (1986; repr., New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 125 – 129, 158 – 160. Nook.
[17] Schick, The Federal Budget, 131 – 132, 136, 138, 142 – 143, 145; US Congress, Congressional Research Service, Authorizations and the Appropriations Process, by James V. Saturno, R46497, May 16, 2023. Adobe PDF; Government Accountability Office, “Appendix II: Federal Budget Formulation and Appropriation Process,” in A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, 117-118.
[18] Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries. Vol. 1, November 1981 – January 1985, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010), 210. Nook.
[19] Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, 108 – 111, 151, 155; Schick, The Federal Budget, 39.; “Biggest-Ever Defense Budget Obscured by Flak,” New York Times, December 12, 1982.
[20] US Congress, Government Accountability Office, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP (September 2005), 85, 93, 95-96, 120. Adobe PDF.
[21] US Congress, Congressional Research Service, Expiration and Cancellation of Unobligated Funds, by Taylor N. Riccard, IF12329 (February 15, 2023). Adobe PDF.
[22] Department of the Navy, Justifications of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1984 (U) Procurement: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (Washington, D.C: Office of the Comptroller, January 1983), 15. Adobe PDF; Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984, Public Law 98-94, 98th Congress, 1st sess. (September 24, 1983).
[23] Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1984, Public Law 98-396, 98th Congress, 2nd sess. (August 22, 1984).
[24] US Department of Defense, “Defense Spending as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),” Accessed August 13, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2002099941/.
[25] Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 906, 1025.
[26] Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 398; Jonathan M. House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1962 – 1991 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2020), 280. Nook.
[27] Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2004), 214. Nook; Norman Friedman, U.S. Submarines since 1945, Revised Edition: An Illustrated Design History, rev. ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 2018), 166.
[28] Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War (New York: Presidio Press, 2005), 224, 226. Nook; 15; Department of Defense. “FY 1982: Annual Report to the Congress.” Harold Brown. January 19, 1981. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1981_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150845-130.; Friedman, The Fifty-Year War, 380.
[29] CQ Press Library, “National Security, 1975 Overview,” CQ Almanac 1975, 31st ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 361 – 364. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal75-1214242.; Blechman, Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, Setting National Priorities: The 1976 Budget, 85, 89 – 91
[30] Jimmy Carter, A Government as Good as Its People (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1996), 108, 120-121, 148, 222-223. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22h6q8j.1.
[31] Ronald Reagan, “Address on Central America Before a Joint Session of the Congress, April 27, 1983,” in Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 148 – 149; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 29 – 30.
[32] Jonathan Reed Winkler, “Reagan and the Military,” in A Companion to Ronald Reagan, ed. Andrew L. Johns (Oxford, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2015), 167. https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/doi/book/10.1002/9781118607770.
[33] Donald T. Regan, For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1988), 172.
[34] Winkler, “Reagan and the Military,” 167.
[35] Department of Defense, “FY 1983: Annual Report to the Congress,” A-6; ——. “FY 1988: Annual Report to the Congress,” Caspar W. Weinberger, January 12, 1987, 325. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1983_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150929-423.
[36] CQ Press Library, “Defense 1984: Overview,” in CQ Almanac 1984 (40th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), 33 – 36. https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/toc.php?mode=cqalmanac-toc&level=2&values=1984+-+98th+Congress%2C+2nd+Session; Friedman, The Fifty-Year War, 458; Paul Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), 283. Nook; Wirls, Buildup, 35 – 37.
[37] Excludes $300 million for Coast Guard, but includes a supplemental (PL98-396); Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984, Public Law 98-212, 98th Congress, 1st sess. (December 8, 1983); Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1984, Public Law 98-396, 98th Congress, 2nd sess. (August 22, 1984).
[38] CQ Press Library, “$187.5 Billion Set for Defense Buildup,” in CQ Almanac 1983 (39th ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1984), 175 – 93. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal80-1175242.
[39] Cong. Rec., 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, vol. 127, pt. 26: 28006.
[40] The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Table 8.4 – Outlays by Budget Enforcement Act Category as Percentages of GDP: 1962 – 2028,” Historical Tables. Accessed August 24, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/; ——., “Table 8.2 – Outlays by Budget Enforcement Act Category in Constant (FY2012) Dollars: 1962 – 2028,” Historical Tables. Accessed August 24, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/.
[41] Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America., 3rd. ed. (New York: Free Press, 2012), 368. Nook.
[42] Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, of United States Army in World War II, The War Department, edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield (1950, repr., Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991), 16. Adobe PDF; William A. Taylor, Military Service and American Democracy: From World War II to the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 32. Nook.
[43] Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, of United States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces (1947, repr., Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), 203.
[44] Stewart, ed. American Military History, 72.
[45] Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 431.
[46] Department of the Treasury, The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1938), x, 527, 645. Adobe PDF; ——., The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1939), xxiii, 569, 697. Adobe PDF; ——., The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1940), xxi, 647, 751. Adobe PDF; ——., The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1941), xix, 681, 801. Adobe PDF. ——. The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1942), xxiii, 763, 895. Adobe PDF.
[47] The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1952 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1951), M10, M26-M28, M33-34. Adobe PDF; The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Table 3.1—Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2028,” Historical Tables, Accessed August 15, 2023. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/BUDGET-2024-TAB/summary.; Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973), 368-370, 380-381.
[48] The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1952, M5-M9; The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Table 3.1—Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2028.”; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 511-512.
[49] The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Table 3.1—Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940–2028”; Schick, The Federal Budget, 18, 31; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 543.
[50] Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 70.
[51] Carter, Keeping Faith, 73.
[52] Jimmy Carter, “Pardon Yes, Amnesty No,” in A Government as Good as Its People (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1996), 124 – 125. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22h6q8j.1.; ——, “I Owe the People Everything,” in A Government as Good as Its People, 138.; ——., “The Second Carter-Ford Debate: Foreign Policy,” in A Government as Good as Its People, 181.
[53] Edwin C. Meyer, National Defense Funding Levels for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearing before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, H.A.S.C. 96-41, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d sess., May 29, 1980. 18.
[54] Frank L. Jones, A “Hollow Army” Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 11. Adobe PDF. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/331/.
[55] Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive 18, “US National Strategy,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum (August 24, 1977). https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/additional-resources/national-security-council/presidential-directives; Jones, A “Hollow Army” Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness, 27.
[56] Edward C. Keefer, Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge 1977 – 1981, Secretaries of Defense Historical Series 9 (Washington D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), 35 – 37. Adobe PDF.
[57] “Confidence in the Military: April 6 -9, 1979.” The Gallup Opinion Index: Political, Social and Economic Trends 166 (May 1979): 4; “Whose Stronger Militarily? August 3 – 6, 1979.” The Gallup Opinion Index: Political, Social and Economic Trends 171 (October 1979): 21.
[58] “Americans see 1979 as year in which national influence, power will grow; foreign publics remain unconvinced.” The Gallup Opinion Index: Political, Social and Economic Trends 162 (January 1979): 16 – 17.
[59] House, A Military History of the Cold War, 1962 – 1991, 280.
[60] “Adequacy of Defense Spending: January 25 – 28, 1980.” The Gallup Opinion Index: Political, Social and Economic Trends 175 (February 1980): 10; Herschel Kantor, John C. Baker, Robert P. Berman, and Heidi M. Pasichow, “Defense Spending,” in Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), 213 – 214, 231 – 232; Aaron, Henry, Thomas A. Dine, Robert W. Hartman, Bruce K. MacLaury, Daniel J. B. Mitchell, and Joseph A. Pechman, Setting National Priorities: The 1980 Budget, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), 161 – 163; Barry P. Bosworth, Robert W. Hartman, William W. Kaufmann, Joseph A. Pechman, and A. James Reichley. Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 134 – 135.